This Special Edition of Water Policy is one outcome of an innovative educational and research project, the Harvard Water Federalism Project, designed to train a new generation of students from a wide variety of disciplines to address the growing challenge of water security. This paper describes the core ideas behind the project, namely the creation of a new generation of 'specialized integrators' and that of exposing students to the wisdom of 'thinking practitioners'. The paper describes the particular water problem chosen, namely that of the infrastructural and institutional challenges involved with the development and management of water in large rivers (the Colorado, Indus, Mississippi, Murray-Darling and São Francisco) in federal countries (Australia, Brazil, Pakistan and the United States). The paper serves as an overview to the basin papers written by multi-disciplinary student teams, and draws some general lessons from this comparative analysis.
Four years ago Harvard University started a Water Security Initiative (WSI), which had the broad goal of initiating a new generation of teaching and research on the major, existential aspects of water management.
The Water Security Initiative was built on several core ideas, including the following.
• Application of a wide range of disciplines: The comparative advantage of a great university is in bringing together strengths from the wide range of disciplines available at such a universitynecessarily with a home in engineering, but also engaging law, business, public health, economics, public policy, anthropology, history and earth sciences.
• Creating a generation of specialized integrators: The aim is to train a new generation of 'specialized integrators' who have deep disciplinary knowledge but also have learned that other disciplines are vital, and have learned how to work in integrated teams, thus making the whole more than the sum of the parts.
• Bridging the gulf between theory and practice: In the words of one seasoned water diplomat (John McDonald, quoted in Alam (1998) ), 'practitioners never read, and academics never practice'. A core challenge is to bridge this gap, in this case by engaging faculty and students with 'thinking practitioners'. An associated challenge in the United States is that as the era of infrastructure development has passed, so the institutions of higher education have lost interest and competence in building and even maintaining infrastructure (Briscoe, 2010) . The initiative works both in countries where infrastructure has been built and where it needs to be built. The initiative concentrates on geographies where faculty has had long engagement with the actual challenge of water development and management, and with the practitioners, political leaders and policy makers.
• Bridging the gap between writing and doing: Academics in general, and students in particular, naturally give great credence to the written word, as evidenced both in academic journals and in non-reviewed postings on the internet. A central conclusion of this project was that there is often a vast gulf between the views of 'those who write' and the views of 'those who do'. Perhaps the most basic lesson learned by the students in this project was of the existence of this gap, of the need to make sure that what they read is balanced by what actually happens on the ground, and of the respect they gained for the thinking practitioners on the front line of real-world water management.
• Recognition that all management solutions are provisional: Most students come to the issue of water with a strong sense that much of what has been done in the past was wrong, and that the 'new' ideas (e.g. of sustainability, climate change and participation) provide a normative framework for change. A longer, historical, view suggests that there is nothing particularly special about this era and that the history of water management is a history of challenges (which change over time) and responses. In his book on four centuries of water management in Germany, Harvard historian Blackbourn (2007) describes all water management actions as 'provisional'. The implication is that context matters, a lot, and that great care needs to be taken in extrapolating findings from one period to another, or from a rich country to a poor country. For example, care needs to be taken in assuming that what is 'right' for a rich country that has built extensive infrastructure today is 'right' for a contemporary poor country that has not been able to make such investments. The stark divide among countries is evident in the stocks of infrastructure that have been constructed in the arid basins included in this study. On the one hand, on the Colorado, the United States has built a capacity to hold about 1,000 days of average river flow, and on the Murray-Darling, reservoirs can hold about 600 days of flow. On the São Francisco, in a middle-income country, reservoirs can hold about 200 days of average flow, while poor Pakistan has been able to create storage to hold only 30 days of average flow on the Indus. Accordingly, a core idea in the Water Security Program is that before assessing what needs to be done, policy analysis needs to start with an understanding of the history of challenges and responses, and of the ways in which past institutional and infrastructural responses create path dependency.
• Understanding that institutions are more than simply organizations: Douglass North, the father of institutional economics, provides a powerful definition, which provided a basis for the work done in each basin. 'Institutions', he states (North, 1997) , 'are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies [ …]'
• Taking into account politics at all levels, including the institutional and psychological residues of history: Most research and policy analysis approach water management from a technocratic perspective. Harvard biologist E. O. Wilson has provided (in the context of biotechnology) a structure that is highly applicable to water policy. The contemporary challenge, he states (Whitney, 2009) , is that we have God-like technologies, medieval institutions and Paleolithic emotions. The corollary is that effective approaches to water management (a) cannot only be technocratic, but must take into account politics at all levels and (b) are not written on a blank sheet of paper but must take into account the institutional and psychological residues of history. Among other things, this means that water management cannot be understood in isolation from the broader political environment in which such management is immersed. The possibilities are quite different in a specific country at different times, in the United States, for example, in the era of the New Deal and the contemporary era of 'planning by constraints' (Reuss, 2003) . The possibilities are quite different in a country like Australia where there is widespread use of market instruments, and in a country like Brazil where the constitution prohibits the use of such instruments for water management. And challenges and possibilities are quite different in countries like Pakistan, where there is little infrastructure and endemic water insecurity (either too much or too little), and the United States, where current generations have never known deprivation of water, food or energy.
The process
The idea of the project was the result of a common set of interests by faculty and students alike of the Water Security Initiative, on the one hand, and the Environmental Law Program of Harvard Law School on the other. A core faculty group (the authors of this paper) designed the project.
The process started with the identification of five major rivers in federal countries. In four of the casesthe Murray-Darling in Australia, the Indus in Pakistan, the São Francisco in Brazil and the Mississippi in the United States -faculty had decades-long involvement and deep relations with many key stakeholders. The Colorado was added as an iconic case of management of a multi-state river in the arid western United States. In all cases political, policy and thought leaders from the basins responded enthusiastically to the request for collaboration.
In September 2011 the faculty put out a notice to students advertising the project. We received approximately 80 applications from students across the university. Of these we chose 30, which we divided into five interdisciplinary teams (one for each basin), comprising one graduate student from the engineering school, one student from the law school, three other graduate students (chosen from among the School of Public Health, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and the Kennedy School) and one college student.
The faculty developed a three-part template for the work. Part one, done in the fall, was an assessment of the historic challenges and responses (in terms of institutions and infrastructure) in each basin, and an initial assessment of current challenges and potential responses. This was based largely on traditional book research, with extensive engagement with faculty who knew the basin. Part two, completed during January 2012, consisted of structured basin trips in which each team traveled to their assigned basin to engage directly with political, technical and academic experts in the field. This was intended to build on the background research conducted in the fall. Part three, which took place in the spring, required students to incorporate their research and interviews into 'basin papers', which served as background papers for an April 2012 workshop. This step was the most challenging, because students had to distill the most salient facts, identify the most important themes, and produce a compelling narrative account that basin experts would readily recognize. The students submitted, and faculty edited, several drafts of these papers.
The workshop was held over two days in April 2012. In addition to the students and faculty, experts 3 (politicians, practitioners and researchers) from each of the basins were invited to attend. This was not a conventional academic meeting but rather one that put the students and their work at the center, and facilitated dialogue between students and experts on each of the basins and across the basins. The first day was devoted to a series of basin presentations. In each case the students made a 20-minute PowerPoint presentation, which was followed by comments from a panel of experts (three from the basin being presented, and three from other basins). At the end of the first day, the students and experts suggested cross-cutting topics, of which they selected four for further discussion on the second day. The students participated extensively throughout the two days. They asked questions of other panelists, provided additional comment, and many provided summations of their experience for all the conference participants in closing remarks.
What was learned about the process
At the end of the meeting, both students and experts filled out questionnaires regarding the process. The responses from both groups were overwhelmingly positive. Many students stressed in particular the value of working on interdisciplinary teams and the benefit of visiting the basins to interact with local experts. Feedback from conference participants, also formally solicited, was likewise positive, with many praising the high quality of the student papers and presentations; the value of Harvard training a new generation of 'specialized integrators'; the way the project engaged students and practitioners; the open structure of the workshop; and the benefit of strengthening ties among the key organizations in the basins. Many hoped and expected that there would be student engagement in the basins in years to come.
One of the underlying objectives of the project was to create a 'community of water practice' that would engage students from around the university. One measure of the success of the project was that 18 of the 30 students were, and are, focusing on water in their undergraduate, masters or doctoral theses, in most cases focusing on issues that had arisen in the course of their engagement during the Water Federalism Project.
The basin narratives
The basin papers in this volume provide detailed assessments by the student teams of how the institutions and infrastructure arose, what challenges they now face and what some of the elements for addressing these challenges might be. In broad outline, the basin narratives are as follows.
Australia's Murray-Darling Basin
The Murray-Darling Basin covers much of south-eastern and eastern Australia. In hydrological terms the system is small, with an average annual flow to the sea of just 14 billion (10 9 ) cubic meters. Under the Australian Constitution, water is primarily a state responsibility. During the 20th century there were massive investments in infrastructure for hydropower and irrigation. The dams of the basin can now store about 600 days of average flow of the river system.
Towards the latter part of the 20th century there were clear bio-physical and institutional signs that water in the basin had been over-allocated. As part of a broader economic reform program, a cooperative framework agreed by both the federal and state governments was put in place, which separated land and water rights, and focused on removing barriers to intra-and inter-state water trade. The framework worked effectively during a decade-long drought at the start of the 21st century. Water moved from low-value to high-value uses, and the economic impact of the drought was small. Over recent decades there has been an important shift in social values, with maintenance of environmental quality now central. The past decade has seen this shift in social values result in large institutional changes, with the prior, consensual model of state cooperation replaced by a model in which the federal government assumes greater responsibility. This shift in both priorities and institutional mandates has been difficult and contested and is still in process.
The United States' Colorado Basin
The Colorado is the vital and dominant basin in the arid west and south-western United States. In hydrological terms the system is small, with an average flow of just 18 billion (10 9 ) cubic meters. While the US Constitution is silent on the relative state and federal roles in water policy, for the first century or so water policy was primarily a state subject. But gradually the national government came to play a larger role, first to promote navigation, then to build irrigation projects, to provide water for Native Americans and for various purposes connected with federal lands, for flood control and, in recent times, to protect environmental values. The development of the west and south-west was dependent on harnessing the Colorado River to provide electricity and reliable sources of water for irrigation and the growing cities. Today the dams on the Colorado can store about 1,000 days of average flow of the river.
Building this infrastructure required an agreement among the states on water rights, with the Colorado Compact negotiated and finally signed in 1922 in order to get agreement on the building of the Hoover Dam. In the latter half of the 20th century there were many institutional and bio-physical signs of an over-allocated system. Driven by changing social values, and especially the growing importance of environmental quality, there have been changes in the way in which the system has been operated. In contrast to the Australian system, there is little use of market instruments for inter-state water trades.
The United States' Lower Mississippi Basin
The Mississippi is a large river, with an annual average flow of about 600 billion ( 10 9 ) cubic meters. Because it reaches deep into the heartland of the United States (the basin covers almost half of the land area of the continental United States) the basin provided, and continues to provide, essential water transport for heavy goods, for which enormous resources in locks, dams and ports have been invested. The Mississippi River Commission was founded by the federal government 1879 to manage navigation from the head waters to the mouth in the Gulf of Mexico. Because the waters of the basin funnel through Mississippi and Louisiana, floods in these states have long been a great threat to settlement and well-being. After the epic flood of 1927 the role of the federal government, previously confined to navigation, was expanded to include flood protection. The institutions and infrastructure built for navigation and flood protection have been spectacularly successful. In 2011 a flood that was slightly larger than the 1927 flood was managed with little economic and social disruption. The basin now faces a set of challenges that include: maintaining the very large stock of aging infrastructure; dealing with a large hypoxic zone in the Gulf of Mexico; arresting the degradation of the coastal zone; restoring wetlands and biodiversity in the basin; and expanding engagement in integrated management beyond the lower basin.
Pakistan's Indus Basin
The Indus is a large river, with an average annual flow of about 100 billion (10 9 ) cubic meters. The Indus has a long history, with one of the first urban civilizations flourishing on its banks over 4,000 years ago. The contemporary history of the basin started in the 19th century, when the British created the largest contiguous irrigation system with the waters of the basin. Storage in the basin, however, remains small, with the dams able to hold only about 30 days of average river flow.
The Indus irrigation system has faced a series of existential challenges, ranging from the partition of the basin in 1947 to an era in which waterlogging and salinity threatened sustainability and to the contemporary challenges associated with over-abstraction, a falling water table, low productivity, environmental degradation and growing conflicts from the inter-provincial to local levels. Under the Pakistan Constitution, water is primarily the responsibility of the provinces, with the federal government playing an important role in the assignment of water rights, the building of major infrastructure and the arbitration of inter-provincial conflicts.
Brazil's São Francisco Basin
Brazil's north-east is a region of endemic aridity, a reality that gave rise to a paternalistic and stagnating 'culture of drought'. A paradox is that the region is traversed by the São Francisco, a large river with an annual flow of about 100 billion (10 9 ) cubic meters. The Brazilian Constitution assigns a much larger role in water management to the federal government than is the case in Australia, the United States or Pakistan. All rivers that pass through, or alongside, more than one state are 'federal rivers'. Ever since the region was settled, the hope has been that the waters of the São Francisco can be harnessed to enhance water security, and construct a water platform for economic growth. In the 20th century the waters of the river were tapped to provide the major source of electricity for the region, and there has been some (fitful) development of irrigation along the banks of the river. The dams on the river can store about 200 days of average flow of the river. Over the last decade work has started on 'the transposição', a project that will transfer (over an elevation of a thousand meters) about 1% of the flow of the river to the arid states to the north. Major questions arise about how to make this project enhance the overall water security of the receiving states, and what institutional arrangements and economic instruments are most appropriate for this purpose.
What was learned about substance
There were several general lessons on water management that emerged from the case studies and the discussions about commonalities among these.
Lesson One: improved water security was the driving force for basin development, with institutions and infrastructure put in place to address specific, high-priority-at-the-time objectives
In all of the river basins, development was motivated by the need to reduce water insecurity (the frequency and impact of droughts and floods) and to build a water platform for economic growth. In some cases, providing a stable supply of water to growing industries (irrigated agriculture in the Indus, Colorado and Murray-Darling, and the cities of the south-west in the case of Colorado) was a major motivation for investment in large dams and associated infrastructure. Managing water for navigation was a central motivator in the Mississippi and Murray-Darling. At the other end of the spectrum, protection against the ravages of floods was a powerful motivator in the case of the Colorado, the Mississippi and partially in the Indus. Finally, use of water for cheap, reliable and sustainable hydropower was a powerful motivator for development of the Murray-Darling, Indus, Colorado and São Francisco rivers.
In all cases the investments required clarification of the respective rights of the states and the federal government, and the establishment of institutions and instruments for managing the water and the flow of benefits and costs. In short, infrastructure and institutions were two sides of the same coin. For example, the Colorado Compact was required for the construction of the Hoover Dam; the Mississippi River Commission was necessary to get agreement, first on navigation and later on flood management; the succession of federal-state institutions on the Murray-Darling defined the rules that would govern management of the river. In all cases the combination of infrastructure and institutions proved, to varying degrees, highly successful in building the water platform for economic growth.
Lesson Two: there are no definitive solutions, with the history of the basins revealing a cycle of challenge and response, then new challenge and new response, and so on
In all cases studied, success in meeting the original challenges gave rise, over time, to a new set of challenges, which arose largely because of the success of the original responses. In the Indus, Colorado and Murray-Darling the application of large amounts of water to arid fields ('making the desert bloom') led to massive increases in production, but also to major challenges in managing salinity. In three of the four arid basins (the Colorado, the Murray-Darling and the Indus) success led to an inexorable increase in demand for now-reliable water, in all cases without taking account of the impact diminished flows would have on the environment, and especially on the deltas. (In the fourth case, the São Francisco, diversions are still just a small fraction of the sustainable yield.) Similarly the navigation and flood protection works on the Mississippi, along with changes resulting from the oil and natural gas industry and natural changes, had major impacts on flow and sediment regimes, again with profound effects on the delta and coastal zones. As described in the case studies, there has been progress in dealing with some of these second-generation issues, but there remains a long way to go -and many trade-offs to be made -in all cases.
Lesson Three: options for the future are dependent on what now exists (both institutions and infrastructure)
The architects of the responses to the 'original challenges' in each basin devised solutions that were constrained by natural conditions and political realities. But they had basically clean sheets of paper in terms of designing infrastructure and institutions to create the water platform for economic growth. Succeeding generations of basin planners and managers face a quite different task, because existing infrastructure and institutions (and the implicit sharing of benefits and costs) constitute major constraints in what can be done in the basins. In no cases has there been a decision to return to anything like original conditions. Successful interventions have built on the original successes but also involved important changes. For example, the operating rules on the Colorado now allow for periodic emulation of natural flood events, and for storage of Mexican water for later release into the delta. Similarly, in search of the right balance for a 'healthy, working river' there have been purchases of water from irrigators to apply to environmental ends in the Murray-Darling. In the Mississippi a convergence of good flood risk-management practice and greater respect for the environment now means that in times of flood water is diverted into environmentally rich 'backwaters' and 'floodways'.
Lesson Four: values change over time and with the level of economic development
In all of the basins the definitive, path-setting infrastructure and institutions were developed at a time when land settlement and economic growth were the overwhelming regional and national priorities. The relationship with economic growth was dialectic -water control meant more economic growth, which in turn meant more investment in infrastructure. This is reflected in the infrastructure endowments of the study basins in arid environments: the amount of average flow that can be stored on the Colorado is 1,000 days, the Murray-Darling 600, the São Francisco 200 and the Indus 30 days.
Two related realities have meant that water management objectives have changed dramatically in the case studies in rich countries (the United States and Australia), only somewhat in the middle-income case (Brazil) and little in the one poor country (Pakistan). The first reality is that it has become apparent that where there have been large investments in infrastructure (for example, in the United States and Australia), the law of diminishing marginal returns has become clear. The second reality is that when societies become rich, they no longer worry so much about basics (enough food and energy) and turn their attention more to environmental concerns. The combination means that there has been a dramatic change in the values that drive water management in rich societies. This secular change notwithstanding, there are clear and strong differences in perceptions among different groups in society. For urban dwellers in California or Australia secure food and energy are taken for granted, and the role of water management in securing these is obscure at best. For farmers and those living in floodplains the continuing role of the 'old infrastructure and institutions' in this security remains palpable, with a resulting caution about dramatic changes in 'rules of the game'. In poor societies (for example, Pakistan) it remains inconceivable that scarce water, with a high opportunity cost in agriculture, would be allocated solely to environmental purposes.
Lesson Five: informal practices are as important as formal rules All of the basins have formal institutional arrangements that underpin the distribution of benefits and costs, and the resultant operation of the water systems. As values have changed, there has been a natural and often appropriate focus on changing formal arrangements (laws and organizations) so that management conforms more closely to new values and priorities. The case studies reveal that resulting changes in practice have been far from mechanical, in part because of resistance from some major parties to the changes, and in part because the strengths of informal bonds of trust and familiarity are undervalued. In the words of one participant, 'trust passes from people to institutions'. Some examples are revealing. In recent decades there has been extensive (but widely varying) use of the courts to change water practice in the western United States. Practitioners almost uniformly now see this tendency as counter-productive, and give great weight to the bonds of trust and mutual understanding that have arisen among professionals, officials and advocates. Similarly in Australia, the recent federalization of water management in the Murray-Darling was designed in large part to overcome the slow pace of reform in a consensus-based system and a disrespect for the practitioners who had found a set of creative and practical solutions to some very complex challenges. But six years of experience show that there are few short cuts, and that sound professional judgment and networks of people with dirt under their fingers are a strength, not a weakness, of the system.
Lesson Six: comparative analysis provides insights, but lessons are highly contextual A primary motivation for the work done in this project was the value of comparative analysis. In some cases there were very long engagements in this sort of 'what can be learned from others' analysis. A fascinating case involves three of the regions in this project (Teisch, 2011) . In the early 20th century western US water engineers looked to the Indian subcontinent for inspiration in modern water management. In the same period there were strong links forged between western US water planners and their counterparts in the Murray-Darling Basin. What emerged from those exchanges was that, yes, there was a lot to be learned, but there was also so much that was contextual that there were many nuances and caveats in any learning experiences. (For example, the then-iconic system of the Indus Basin was based on an overwhelming role for the state, with little role for private rights. The extrapolation of lessons in management was limited when -as in the western United States -private water rights were the bedrock of the system.)
And so, too, it is with the comparative analysis in this project. As described above, there are some general lessons that can be drawn from the cases. But the broader point is that context -natural, historical, cultural, political, economic, legal -is decisive. Consider just one case, namely the lessons that can be drawn from the 135-year experience of the Mississippi River Commission (MRC). The MRC's engagement model is remarkable, including biannual meetings on the river of the commission officials with local groups, and the forging of a consensus on what will be built where and how it will operate. But the MRC points out that this model, which works so well in the lower river, would never work in the upper tributaries, where flooding is a lesser issue and the river plays a quite different role. It points out that many of the levers that are necessary for management of the river (such as the operating rules for the dams on the Missouri) remain, and will continue to remain, beyond its control. When the MRC engages with other basins with some similar problems (as it does), it does so with an acute understanding of both the strengths and limitations of its own model, and an acute understanding that there are certain 'transferables' (professional competence and trust with the communities) but that each society and each basin has to find its own path to addressing its own challenges.
